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ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS-THE UNITED NA-
TIONS CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOR-
EIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
Sigval Bergesen, a Norwegian owner of three cargo vessels, and
Joseph Muller Corporation, a Swiss company, entered into ship-
ping contracts for the transportation of chemicals and propylene in
1969, 1970, and 1971.1 Each contract contained a clause providing
for arbitration in New York in the event of dispute.2 In 1972, after
disagreements arose while performing the 1970 and 1971 contracts,
Bergesen made a demand for arbitration of his claims for demur-
rage, shifting and port expenses.' Muller denied liability and as-
serted counterclaims.4 A panel of arbitrators in New York held
hearings and rendered a written decision in favor of Bergesen on
December 14, 1978. 5
Bergesen initially sought enforcement of the award in Switzer-
land; however, Muller successfully resisted enforcement for more
than two years.6 On December 10, 1981, shortly before expiration
of the applicable statute of limitations,7 Bergesen filed a petition in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York to confirm the award under provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards.8 Muller contended that the Convention could not pro-
Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 548 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 710 F.2d 928,
929 (2d Cir. 1983). The contracts provided for the ocean carriage of cargoes consisting of
vinyl chloride monomer and propylene between United States, Caribbean, and European
ports. Bergesen, 548 F. Supp. at 651.
* Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 929. There is no dispute that the contracts contained enforceable
arbitration clauses. Bergesen, 548 F. Supp. at 651.
Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 929-30.
Id. at 930. The panel rejected all of Muller's counterclaims except one. The net award to
Bergesen was $61,406.09 with interest. Id.
' Id. The initial panel of arbitrators chosen by the parties was dissolved because of
Muller's objections, and a second panel was selected through the offices of the American
Arbitration Association. Id.
' Id. at 930. Muller resisted the Swiss action on grounds that the arbitration did not fall
within the Convention and that, to be enforceable as a judgment in Switzerland, the award
had to be confirmed under the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7150. Bergesen,
548 F. Supp. at 651-52.
The statute of limitations had a three year length. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1976).
' The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept.
30, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (effective Dec. 29, 1970) [here-
inafter cited as U.N. Cony.]. The United States did not sign the Convention until 12 years
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vide a basis for enforcement in the United States of an award ren-
dered in the United States because such an award would not come
within the Convention's definition of a "foreign" award.9 The dis-
trict court rejected Muller's argument, however, and confirmed
Bergesen's award holding that the Convention applied to arbitral
awards rendered in the United States where foreign interests were
involved. 10 On appeal held: affirmed. An arbitral award pro-
nounced in accordance with foreign law or involving parties domi-
ciled or having their principal place of business outside the United
States is a foreign award under the Convention and may be en-
forced in the United States. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710
F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983).
Prior to the formulation of international agreements concerning
foreign arbitral awards, enforcement of such awards was governed
by the domestic law of the country where enforcement was
sought." Attitudes toward enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
varied from state to state, however, so that enforcement under this
system was often unpredictable."2 This uncertainty diminished the
use of arbitration in international trade.13 Two early international
agreements dealing with commercial arbitration proved unwork-
able, largely because they were unsuccessful in increasing predict-
ability of enforcement. 4 Thus, a United Nations conference met in
after its adoption. See McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Convention on
Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 735, 737 "(1971).
' Bergesen, 548 F. Supp. at 654-55. The Convention applies only to "foreign" awards. The
scope of the Convention's coverage is set forth in article I (1):
This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards
made in the territory of a state other than the state where the recognition and
enforcement of such awards are sought .... It shall also apply to arbitral awards
not considered as domestic awards in the States where their recognition and en-
forcement are sought.
U.N. Cony., supra note 8, art. I(1). This definition of scope has been characterized as "one
of the most controversial clauses in the Convention." Contini, International Commercial
Arbitration: The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. J. CoMp. L. 283, 292 (1959).
10 Bergesen, 548 F. Supp. at 651.
" McMahon, supra note 8, at 735.
11 Id. at 736. Traditionally the laws of most countries have distinguished between foreign
and domestic awards. Awards regarded as foreign were often discriminated against. Id. at
739.
13 Id. at 736.
" The two earlier treaties were the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24
1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 157 and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301. For a discussion of the exact nature of the
problems with these treaties, see Contini, supra note 9, at 288-90; Quigley, Accession by the
United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
[Vol. 14:217218
1984] ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS 219
New York in 1958 in an attempt to provide dependable uniform
standards to govern international arbitration.16
The conference was convened to draft a convention which would
apply solely to "foreign" arbitral awards; however, the delegates
were sharply split over what was to be considered a "foreign"
award. 16 The original draft provided that the Convention would
apply only to the recognition and enforcement of awards rendered
in a country other than that where enforcement was sought.1 7
Under this territorial criterion, the nationality of an award would
be determined exclusively by the place where it was rendered."8
The Western Europeans"s objected to this proposal arguing that
other factors, such as the nationality of the parties, the object of
the dispute, and the rules of arbitral procedure, should also be
considered.2
In response to these objections, eight European countries2 ' pro-
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1055 (1961).
" For a discussion of the exact sequence of events leading up to the Convention, see The
United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, 53 AM. J. INT'L L.
414, 414-15 (1959); Mirabito, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The First Four Years, 5 GA. J. IT'L & ComP. L. 471,
485-88 (1975).
To a large extent the conference was successful; as a result, the use of arbitration to re-
solve disputes has risen sharply in the last two decades. See generally Haight, International
Arbitration, 14 CASE W. REs. INT'L L.J. 253 (1982). As just one indication, the number of
cases heard by the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce has
risen from 32 in 1956 to 188 in 1976 and now averages around 250 annually. Id. See also
Aksen, International Arbitration-Its Time Has Arrived!, 14 CAsE W. Ris. INT'L L.J. 247
(1982); Harnik, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 31 AM. J. Com.
L. 703 (1983).
10 Contini, supra note 9, at 292. The conference was split roughly between the countries
of Western Europe on one side, and the common law, Latin American, and Eastern Euro-
pean countries on the other. Id.
17 Id.
1" See id. at 292; McMahon, supra note 8, at 740.
" The Western European group was composed of the delegates of Italy, West Germany,
France, and Turkey. Contini, supra note 9, at 292.
m0 Id. These countries argued that the place where an award is made is often chosen
merely as a matter of convenience and, where arbitration takes place by correspondence, it
may be impossible to establish where an award was rendered. In addition, they pointed out
that in some countries, such as France and Germany, the nationality of an arbitral award
depends on the law governing the procedure. For example, an arbitral award rendered in
London under German law is considered a domestic award in Germany, and an award ren-
dered in Paris under foreign law is considered a foreign award in France. Id. See also Mc-
Mahon, supra note 8, at 740; S. ExEc. Doc. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1968). Arguably,
therefore, in states where this system prevails, the Convention should not mandate that all
awards rendered abroad be regarded as foreign. Contini, supra note 9, at 292.
" Austria, Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden,
and Switzerland. Contini, supra note 9, at 292 n.41.
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posed that the Convention apply to awards "other than those con-
sidered as domestic in the country where enforcement is sought. 22
This standard was strongly opposed, however, by a third group of
countries which included the United States.23 The third group of
countries was concerned that the "not considered as domestic" cri-
terion was vague and, therefore, would not lend itself to uniform
enforcement. 4 They were particularly concerned that the standard
would be misunderstood and improperly applied by common law
nations;25 thus, they argued in favor of the territorial criterion ini-
tially proposed, because it provided a standard which could be ap-
plied with absolute uniformity.26
The dispute was subsequently referred to a Working Party27
which formulated the compromise provision ultimately adopted in
the Convention. 8 In its final form, the Convention applies both to
awards rendered in a country other than the country where en-
forcement is sought and to awards "not considered as domestic" in
the state where enforcement is sought.2 9 In addition to this state-
22 Id. at 292-93.
The proposal was also opposed by Israel, the United Kingdom, El Salvador, Argentina,
Colombia, Guatemala, and Japan. Id. at 293.
24 Id. These countries argued that while the territorial criterion was clear, the "not con-
sidered as domestic" test was susceptible to different interpretations and would not give the
business world any certainty as to which awards would be covered by the Convention. Id.
25 Id. Under the law of common law nations, the place where the award is rendered is the
only criterion which determines whether an award is foreign or domestic. McMahon, supra
note 8, at 740.
" Contini, supra note 9, at 293.
" The Working Party was composed of delegates from Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France,
West Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Turkey, the USSR, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 293
n.44.
" Id. The text proposed by the Working Party was adopted by the conference as the first
paragraph of article I of the Convention. For the text of this provision, see supra note 9.
" Contini, supra note 9, at 293. The members of the Working Party representing the
position of the Western European group agreed to this solution on the understanding that
states would be permitted to exclude certain categories of awards rendered abroad from the
application of the Convention. The conference ultimately decided not to permit these exclu-
sions. Thus, while the apparent intent of the Working Party was to restrict the territorial
principle, the final action taken by the conference had the opposite result of expanding the
Convention's coverage. Id. But see Gaja who argues that while at first glance "the award
must possess only a negative quality: either it is not made in the territory of the State where
recognition or enforcement are or it is not considered as a domestic award by the law of the
same state," there is a limit on this test in that in order to qualify the award must be made
under foreign municipal law. 1 G. GAJA, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: NEw
YORK CONVENTION § I.A.3 (1984). According to Gaja, "no obligation exists under the Con-
vention to recognize awards if they were not made under a foreign municipal law, even if
they were made in the territory of a foreign state or were not considered as domestic
awards." Id.
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ment of the Convention's coverage, the Convention contains two
optional reservations which potentially limit its scope.30 One reser-
vation provides that a signatory country may, on the basis of reci-
procity, declare that it will apply the Convention only to awards
rendered in the territory of another contracting state."1 The other
regulation provides that the Convention will apply only to differ-
ences arising out of legal relationships considered as commercial
under the state's national law.32 The United States elected to
adopt both reservations when it acceded to the Convention. 3
The United States did not sign the Convention at the close of
the conference in 1958.-" In fact, the United States did not approve
30 The two reservations are set forth in article 1(3) of the Convention which states:
When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or notifying extension
under Article X hereof, any state may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it
will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made
only in the territory of another Contracting State. It may also declare that it will
apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether
contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the national law of
the state making such declaration.
U.N. Cony., supra note 8, art. 1(3). The conference rejected a number of other proposed
reservations which would have excluded awards rendered abroad but considered as domestic
in certain countries and awards relating to disputes having no clear international connec-
tion. Contini, supra note 9, at 295.
There are other limitations to a court's ability to hear a dispute under the Convention.
For example, the subject matter of the award must be capable of settlement by arbitration
under the law of the country. Also, the recognition or enforcement of the award must not be
contrary to the public policy of that country. A discussion of the limitations, however, is
outside the scope of this recent development. See generally U.N. Cony. art. V(2)(a)-(b);
Comment, International Commercial Arbitration: The Nonarbitrable Subject Matter De-
fense, 9 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL. 119 (1980); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506
(1974); McMahon, supra note 8, at 753 n.83.
31 U.N. Cony., supra note 8, art. 1(3). Some commentators interpret this reservation as
operating only to limit the territorial criterion set forth in article I(1) by carving out awards
rendered in the territory of a state not a party to the Convention. On the other hand, there
is some indication that this reservation was meant to affect the "not considered as domes-
tic" criterion set forth in the second sentence of article I(1). This latter interpretation would
give a country such as France or Germany, which considers an award rendered within its
territory to be foreign if governed by foreign procedural law, the right to treat such awards
as outside the scope of the Convention, unless other contracting states treated such awards
as foreign for purposes of the Convention. McMahon, supra note 8, at 741 n.29.
" U.N. Cony., supra note 8, art. 1(3).
" Mirabito, supra note 15, at 489.
" The United States delegation to the Convention recommended that the United States
not accede to the Convention for two reasons: 1) adherence to the Convention would confer
no real benefits on the United States, and 2) the Convention would conflict with many state
arbitration laws. The delegation also argued that commercial arbitration did not lie within
the traditional treaty power of the United States. Mirabito, supra note 15, at 486. The then
current Bricker Amendment problems and a now antiquated distrust of arbitration caused
the United States to be an unenthusiastic and largely inactive participant in the Conven-
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the Convention until 1968, and accession was delayed until 1970 to
allow for passage of the necessary implementing legislation. 5 This
domestic legislation defines the scope of the Convention in com-
pletely different terms from those employed by the Convention. 6
Rather than affirmatively stating that the Convention will apply
when the territorial or the "not considered as domestic" tests are
satisfied, the legislation appears instead to set forth circumstances
under which the Convention will not apply. It provides that an
agreement or award arising out of a relationship which is entirely
between citizens of the United States will not be governed by the
Convention unless the relationship involves property located
abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some
"reasonable relation" with a foreign state. 8 Even though the legis-
lation does not use the language of the Convention, some commen-
tators have interpreted this provision as defining when an award
will "not be considered domestic" and thus will be enforceable
under the Convention in United States courts.3 9 Others argue that
tion. Springer, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 INr'L LAw 320, 320-21 (1969). See also Mirabito, supra note 15,
at 486.
" Mirabito, supra note 15, at 487. In 1968, President Johnson urged the Senate to recom-
mend accession to the Convention. The President's letter of transmittal recommended that
United States accession should occur only after passage of domestic legislation implement-
ing the Convention. On October 4, 1968, the Senate consented to accession by a 57-0 vote.
The supplemental legislation was in the form of a bill adding a new chapter 2 to the Federal
Arbitration Act of 1925. Id. See infra note 50.
" Compare U.N. Cony., supra note 8, art. I(1) with 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1976).
37 The legislation provides:
An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal relationship,
whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a trans-
action, contract or agreement described in section 2 of this title falls under the
Convention. An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is
entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under
the Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envis-
ages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation
with one or more foreign states ....
9 U.S.C. § 202 (1976).
" Id. One commentator argued that this language is troublesome as "the nationality of
the parties to the agreement or the subject-matter of the dispute would not be pertinent
considerations in determining whether the agreement falls under the Convention." A.J. VAN
DEN BERG, THE NEw YORK ABIrrEATiON CoNVmNoN oF 1958 18 (1981).
" One commentator states that section 202 of the implementing legislation may be con-
strued to provide that awards rendered in the United States, other than those between citi-
zens of the United States involving strictly domestic matters, are "not considered as domes-
tic" awards and hence fall under the Convention. He questions, however, whether such an
interpretation is correct. McMahon, supra note 8, at 740-43. See also Pisar, The United
Nations Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 33 S. CAL. L. REv. 14, 18 (1959). Pisar
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the "not considered as domestic" standard was not intended to be
applied in the United States and that awards rendered in the
United States are, therefore, not enforceable under the
Convention."'
While the United States Supreme Court has not specifically de-
cided this issue, the Court commented generally on the Convention
in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co."' Scherk involved a contract be-
tween a United States company and a German citizen which pro-
vided for arbitration in Paris of any disputes.4 Although the
Court's decision to enforce the arbitration clause was not primarily
based on the Convention, the Court cited the Convention as evi-
dence of congressional policy in favor of enforcing arbitral awards
whenever possible .4  The Court stated that the goal and principal
underlying purpose of the Convention is to encourage the recogni-
tion and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in in-
ternational contracts and to unify the standards by which such
agreements are observed and enforced."
Although the Court in Scherk was not directly confronted with
the question of whether awards rendered in the United States are
enforceable in the United States under the Convention, lower fed-
eral courts have had several opportunities to decide the issue. s
Two district courts reached divergent conclusions and provided lit-
tle analysis. In Transmarine Seaways Corp. of Monrovia v. Marc
Rich & Co., A.G., 46 a suit between two foreign corporations to con-
firm an arbitration award rendered in New York, the court simply
asserts that the Convention delegates intentionally failed to define the "not considered as
domestic" clause in order to allow signatory nations wide latitude in defining this phrase in
accordance with their own law. Pisar explains that Congress supplied this definition in sec-
tion 202 of the implementing legislation. Id.
10 M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 369-71 (1968). For the
view that traditional United States law has looked to the place where an award is rendered
as the only criterion for determining whether an arbitral award is foreign or domestic, see
McMahon, supra note 8, at 740. Dr. van den Berg goes further and argues that the Conven-
tion never applies to the enforcement of an arbitral award which is rendered in the country
in which enforcement of such award is sought because such an award would be a domestic
award. Supra note 38, at 19.
'1 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
" Id. at 508.
Id. at 520 n.15.
4 Id. The Court also noted that the delegates to the Convention were concerned that
courts of signatory nations might refuse enforcement of an award under the Convention
based on parochial views of the desirability of the award. Id.
"' The Court in Scherk instead enforced the award under the Federal Arbitration Act of
1925 which applies to domestic awards. Id.
,e 480 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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stated that jurisdiction was based on the Convention.47 On the
other hand, in Diapulse Corp. of America v. Carba, Ltd.,4s a suit
between a Delaware corporation and a Swiss corporation involving
modification of an arbitral award also rendered in New York, the
court stated that the Convention did not apply "by its terms."4 9
The appellate courts have also avoided the issue, choosing in-
stead to base decisions on the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
which covers domestic arbitration.50 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in I/S Stauberg v. National Metal Converters, Inc.1 only
addressed the issue of whether the district court had jurisdiction to
enter judgment on an arbitral award under the Federal Arbitration
Act of 1925 when the parties did not explicitly agree to such juris-
diction in the arbitration agreement. 2 The court found that the
district court had jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act;
thus, it refused to consider an alternative argument that jurisdic-
tion would be proper under the Convention. 3
The same court again had the opportunity to decide the issue in
Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 54 a
suit between two foreign parties involving the enforcement in fed-
eral district court of an award rendered in New York.55 Marc Rich
argued that although the suit was between two foreign parties, the
award had been rendered in New York and should be considered
domestic; thus, it was removed from the scope of the Convention."
Andros, on the other hand, argued that the Convention should ap-
ply based on the language of the implementing legislation.5 7 While
,7 Id. at 353. The court relied on Antco Shipping Co. v. Sidermar S.p.A., 417 F. Supp. 207
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1977). Antco involved a dispute between two
foreign corporations. The contract provided for arbitration to take place in New York. The
court stated that an arbitration agreement in a contract between two foreign corporations
falls within the Convention. Id. at 215.
4I No. 78 Cir. 3263 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), remanded on other grounds, 626 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir.
1980).
49 Id.
- 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-13 (1976). All provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act are applicable to
actions under the 1970 legislation which implements the Convention to the extent the ear-
lier act does not conflict with the later act or with the Convention. Mirabito, supra note 15,
at 492.
s1 500 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1974).
I d. at 425.
I d. at 425-26.
579 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1978).
"Id.
Id. at 699 n.11. Marc Rich argued that the award fell under the Federal Arbitration Act
of 1925 instead of the Convention. Id.
"Id. Andros relied specifically on 9 U.S.C. § 202 which broadly restates the scope of the
[Vol. 14:217
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the court found the dispute to be "intriguing," it again refused to
resolve it.55 The court justified its refusal by stating that regardless
of whether the Convention was applicable, the award would be
confirmed because the Convention's grounds for vacating awards
were no more liberal than those of the Federal Arbitration Act.59
Thus, it was not until Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp. that the
Second Circuit faced the issue. In Bergeson, the court did not have
the option of falling back on the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
because the statute of limitations under that Act had expired.60
To arrive at the conclusion that the Convention does allow en-
forcement in United States courts of an award rendered in the
United States, the Bergesen court looked first to the history of the
Convention.61 The court noted that although the Working Party
had originally hoped to restrict the scope of the Convention, the
inclusion of both the territorial and the "not considered as domes-
tic" standards had the ultimate effect of greatly expanding the
Convention's coverage.6 Relying on the Supreme Court's state-
ment in Scherk that the purpose of the Convention was to en-
courage recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards,
the court concluded that the Convention's provisions should be
broadly construed to allow recognition and enforcement whenever
possible." Accordingly, the court interpreted the Working Party's
Convention. Id.
" Id.
" Id. The court reasoned that if the Convention applies, "a request for confirmation of an
arbitral award must be granted unless one of the Convention's grounds for refusal or defer-
ral of recognition or enforcement of the award" set forth in section 207 of the implementing
legislation appears. Noting that these grounds for refusal were to be construed narrowly, the
court concluded that the Convention was "no more liberal than [the 1925 Act] on the matter
of vacating awards." Thus, "resort to the Convention would not alter the result" of the case.
Id.
" Under both the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 and the 1970 legislation implementing
the Convention, a motion to confirm an arbitration award must be made within one year of
the award. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1976). The implementing legislation, however, permits an applica-
tion to a court having jurisdiction for an order of confirmation "within three years after an
arbitral award falling under the Convention is made. ... 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1976). Bergesen
sought enforcement under section 207 because the one year time limit had expired.
Bergesen, 548 F. Supp. at 652.
01 Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 930.
" See id. at 931. The court stated that under the Working Party's compromise provision,
"the Covention applies to all arbitral awards rendered in a country other than the state of
enforcement, whether or not such awards may be regarded as domestic in that state." The
court then emphasized that the Convention "also applies to all awards not considered as
domestic in the state of enforcement, whether or not any of such awards may have been
rendered in the territory of that state." Id. See also Contini, supra note 9, at 293-94.
" Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932. The court explicitly adopted "the view that awards 'not
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compromise provision to cover both awards rendered outside a
state's territory as well as awards rendered within a state's terri-
tory which are "not considered as domestic" in that state." The
court emphasized that the territorial criterion would operate to in-
clude all awards rendered abroad, even if some of those awards
were considered domestic in the state of enforcement.6 The court
also stressed that the "not considered as domestic" test would en-
compass awards rendered within the territory of the state of en-
forcement so long as the awards were considered nondomestic."
With this interpretive framework established, the court rejected
the defendant's arguments for a narrow interpretation of the Con-
vention. The defendant argued that the "not considered as domes-
tic" test was intended to apply only to awards otherwise unen-
forceable in the territory where rendered due to the presence of
some foreign component. 7 The defendant also argued that because
the United States adopted both reservations when it acceded to
the Convention, Congress intended that the Convention be given a
narrow construction." Finally, the defendant argued that the legis-
lation implementing the Convention was not intended to apply to
awards rendered within the United States."
Relying on Scherk, the court rejected each of the defendant's
arguments as contrary to the Convention's purpose of encouraging
enforcement of foreign awards.7 0 In particular, the Bergesen deci-
considered as domestic' denotes awards which are subject to the Convention not because
made abroad, but because made within the legal framework of another country." Id. The
court clarified this statement by listing awards "pronounced in accordance with foreign law
or involving parties domiciled or having their principal place of business outside the enforc-
ing jurisdictions" as awards which would fall within this definition. Id.; Scherk, 417 U.S. at
520 n.15.
" Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 931. But see Commentary Volume VII, 1982 Y.B. COMM. ARn.
291 (expressing the view that the Convention does not apply to the enforcement of an arbi-
tral award rendered in the country where enforcement is sought).
6 Id. This result is in direct conflict with the Working Party's original intent to restrict
the territorial criterion. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
" Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 931.
Id. at 932. The defendant argued that "the purpose of the 'not considered as domestic'
test was to provide for the enforcement of... 'stateless awards,' i.e., those rendered in the
territory where enforcement is sought but considered unenforceable because of some foreign
component." The court rejected this argument on the grounds that "some countries favoring
the provision" did so "to preclude the enforcement of certain awards rendered abroad, not
to enhance enforcement of awards rendered domestically." Id.
"Id.
Id. at 933.
70 Id. at 932-33. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15. The court also relied on Parsons & Whitte-
more Overseas Co. v. Socift6 Generale de L'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974)
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sion stated that although the reservations narrowed the scope of
the Convention somewhat, its provisions should nevertheless be in-
terpreted broadly."1 The opinion also emphasized that the legisla-
tion specifically defines which awards are "not considered as do-
mestic," evidencing Congress' intent that such awards be
enforceable in United States courts.72 The court found further sup-
port for its view of Congress' intent from sections of the imple-
menting legislation which provide for jurisdiction and venue in dis-
putes between two aliens. 78 Thus, the Bergesen court concluded
that, contrary to the narrow constructions urged by the defendant,
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Convention and the im-
plementing legislation support enforcement of an award rendered
between two aliens.7 4
Although the court in Bergesen purported to base its expansive
interpretation of the "not considered as domestic" clause partly on
an analysis of the Convention's history, the court's interpretation
and application seem inconsistent with discussions of the provision
where the court held that the public policy defense to enforcement of awards under the
Convention should be construed narrowly. Id. at 974.
7' Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 933.
11 Id. The court adopted the view that the Convention left each state free "to define
which awards were to be considered nondomestic." See Pisar, supra note 39, at 18. The
court reasoned that "[h]ad Congress desired to exclude arbitral awards involving two foreign
parties rendered within the United States from enforcement" in United States courts, it
would have spelled this out in its "definition" of nondomestic awards in section 202 of the
implementing legislation. Id. See also Sumitomo Corp. v. Parakopi Compania Maritima, 477
F. Supp. 737, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd mem., 620 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1980).
73 Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 933. Section 203 of the implementing legislation has been held to
provide "jurisdiction for disputes involving two aliens." See also Sumitomo Corp., 477 F.
Supp. at 740-41. Section 203 provides: "An action or proceeding falling under the Conven-
tion shall be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States. The district
courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction over such an action or proceed-
ing, regardless of the amount in controversy." 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1976). The district court in
Sumitomo reasoned that to hold that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking where all par-
ties involved were foreign entities would frustrate the Convention's goal of encouraging the
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Sumitomo Corp., 477 F. Supp. at
741. See also Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15. In addition to jurisdiction, the Bergesen court
found that section 204 provides venue for an action between two aliens. Bergesen, 710 F.2d
at 933. The court also referred to section 206 of the legislation which provides: "[a] court
having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct that arbitration be held... at any place
therein provided for, whether that place is within or without the United States." 9 U.S.C. §
206 (1976). The court stated that "[iut would be anomalous to hold that a district court
could direct two aliens to [arbitrate] within the United States under the statute, but that it
could not enforce the resulting award under the legislation . Bergesen, 710 F.2d at
933.
7' Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932-34.
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during negotiations for the Convention .7  The "not considered as
domestic" provision was initially proposed as an attempt to satisfy
Western European nations that considered certain awards to be
domestic even though rendered abroad.78 The proposal was in-
tended to serve as an alternative to and limitation on the territo-
rial standard so that those countries could avoid enforcing such
awards.7 In contrast, the Bergesen court invoked the "not consid-
ered as domestic" test to reach the opposite result of enforcing
awards rendered domestically.7 8
The Bergesen court's expansion of the "not considered as do-
mestic" test is particularly surprising in light of the United States
delegates' opposition to the provision at the Convention.7 9 This op-
position was such that when both the territorial and the "not con-
sidered as domestic" tests were adopted in the Convention, at least
one commentator doubted whether the United States would ever
apply the latter.80 While the Bergesen court acknowledged the
United States delegates' opposition to the provision, it neverthe-
less rejected the defendant's argument that the provision was not
intended to be applied in the United States.81 Thus, the court not
only expanded the application of the "not considered as domestic"
test, but also ignored traditional United States hostility toward the
'1 Id. at 930. The court discusses the history of the Convention at length, yet does not
seem to consider the history as controlling its decision. Instead, the court bases its decision
almost entirely on the Supreme Court's comments on the Convention in Scherk. See id. at
932-33.
76 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
77 Contini, supra note 9, at 293.
'$ Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932-33. While the court acknowledges that the original purpose
of the "not considered as domestic" criterion was to restrict the territorial concept, it never-
theless adopts a literal reading of the compromise provision provided by the Working Party.
Id. at 931.
7' See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. The Bergesen court acknowledged the
United States delegates' opposition to the provision; however, the court did not consider
this opposition in reaching its decision that the provision should be applied within the
United States. Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 931. It is interesting to note that in another recent
decision involving international commercial arbitration, the Ninth Circuit adopted a narrow
construction of the language in the arbitration agreement. Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc.
v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1983). The case involved an agreement between
a California corporation and a Korean contractor which provided for arbitration of "any
disputes arising hereunder." The court held that this clause was narrow and evidenced an
agreement to arbitrate only those disputes which arose directly out of the contract itself. Id.
" McMahon, supra note 8, at 740. McMahon states that the negotiating history of the
Convention "does not indicate that a country such as the United States, which considered
awards as foreign only if rendered abroad, was expected to apply the "not considered as
domestic" criterion. See generally M. DOMKE, supra note 40, at 369-71.
* Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 933.
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provision. 2
On the other hand, the court's decision to enforce an award ren-
dered in the United States under the "not considered as domestic"
criterion is not inconsistent with the legislation implementing the
Convention in the United States.83 The legislation states that an
agreement arising out of a relationship which is entirely between
citizens of the United States is not enforceable under the Conven-
tion unless it bears some "reasonable relation" to a foreign state.8
This section of the legislation has been interpreted as "providing
that awards rendered in the United States, other than those be-
tween citizens of the United States in strictly domestic matters are
'not considered as domestic'" and are, therefore, enforceable under
the Convention.8" The Bergesen court similarly concluded that the
provision defines which awards are "not considered as domestic" in
the United States.86 Applying this definition, the court reasoned
that because Congress did not specifically exclude an award ren-
dered between two aliens from the scope of the Convention in the
provision, Congress intended that such an award be considered
"nondomestic" and, thus, enforceable under the Convention.8 7
While Congress never specifically states that it is defining the "not
considered as domestic" criterion, the court's interpretation effec-
tuates congressional intent regarding the scope of the Conven-
tion.8 8 The legislative history of the provision indicates that Con-
gress intended to ensure that awards between United States
citizens would be excluded from the Convention's coverage where
no foreign contacts were involved. 9 Neither the language of the
statute nor the legislative history indicate an intent that other
awards rendered in the United States be unenforceable under the
Convention. 0
"' See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
- 9 U.S.C. §§ 202-08 (1976). See also H.R. REP. No. 1181, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, re-
printed in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3601-02 (hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No.
1181].
" For the text of this provision of the legislation, see supra note 37.
McMahon, supra note 8, at 740.
" Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 933. See supra note 72.
" Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 933.
See 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1181, supra note 83.
"The legislative history of section 202 indicates that it was intended to ensure that an
award arising out of a relationship exclusively between citizens of the United States is not
enforceable in United States courts unless it has a "reasonable relation with a foreign state."
H.R. RaP. No. 1181, supra note 83.
90 The legislation only excludes awards rendered "entirely between citizens of the United
States." 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1976). But see McMahon, supra note 8, at 740-43. McMahon ini-
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Regardless of whether the court's decision is consistent with the
United States delegates' position at the Convention or with the
United States implementing legislation, its broad interpretation of
the Convention's scope has several beneficial aspects. First, the
court's broad interpretation furthers the Convention's underlying
purpose of increasing the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.91
The decision serves this purpose by adding awards rendered within
the United States but "not considered as domestic" as another cat-
egory of awards which may be enforced under the Convention."
Thus, the overall instances of enforcement of foreign awards will
increase.93 This increased enforcement is most readily apparent in
cases such as Bergesen where the Convention provides a forum for
enforcement of an award which was otherwise unenforceable.
Second, the court's broad interpretation of the Convention's
scope encourages arbitration as an alternative to litigation.95 To
the extent that the decision allows for increased enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards, it provides an incentive for parties to place
arbitration clauses in international contracts because of the in-
creased certainty that any resulting awards will be enforced." The
tially notes that the language of section 202 supports the interpretation that all "awards
rendered in the United States, other than those between citizens of the United States in
strictly domestic matters, are 'not considered as domestic awards' and, hence, fall under the
Convention." Id. at 740. McMahon asserts however, that the legislative history supports the
argument that this construction is too broad. The legislative history demonstrates "that the
Act was not meant to broaden Federal authority nor apply to interstate commerce" but is
limited to arbitrations arising out of foreign commerce. Id. at 742. McMahon reasons that
the above construction would allow enforcement in the United States of "all awards ren-
dered in the United States between a United States citizen and a foreign national regardless
of whether the dispute arose out of interstate ... commerce." Id. at 742-43. Not every
transaction involving a foreign national is considered as being in foreign commerce, thus the
Act would infringe on the traditional jurisdiction of state courts if given the broad construc-
tion suggested by its language. Id. at 743.
" See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15.
Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 931.
" See id. at 932.
" See supra note 60 and accompanying text. This assumes that Muller could continue to
successfully resist enforcement in Swiss courts. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
's See McMahon, supra note 8, at 735. "Arbitration is speedier, more efficient and eco-
nomical, and better suited to the settlement of disputes involving parties of diverse nation-
alities" than is litigation. See generally Mirabito, supra note 15, at 471; Bagner, Enforce-
ment of International Commercial Contracts by Arbitration: Recent Developments, 14
CAsE W. REs. INT'L L.J. 573 (1982); Aksen, supra note 15; Haight, supra note 15.
" See McMahon, supra note 8, at 735. McMahon asserts that arbitration has advantages
over litigation "only so long as specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate will be
readily ordered and arbitral awards receive the benefit of summary enforcement proceed-
ings. . . ." Id.
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decision, therefore, benefits international businessmen by increas-
ing the extent to which they may rely on binding arbitration and
by decreasing the need to anticipate the expense and inconve-
nience of possible litigation in planning international
transactions.97
Third, under the Convention's reciprocity provisions, the court's
decision will enable United States businessmen to demand enforce-
ment of awards rendered abroad which are "not considered as do-
mestic" in the countries where rendered."e Had the Bergesen court
decided not to apply the Convention to awards rendered within the
United States, other contracting nations could similarly refuse to
enforce awards between United States citizens rendered within
their territory on the basis of lack of reciprocity." These countries
could legitimately refuse enforcement of such awards under the
Convention even though they did not consider the awards to be
"domestic." 100 Under the court's decision, however, other con-
tracting nations are obligated to enforce awards between United
States citizens rendered within their territory based on the Con-
vention's reciprocity provisions. 1'01
Finally, the court's broad interpretation provides a fair result be-
tween the parties in Bergesen. The parties agreed in advance to
binding arbitration and, after such arbitration had taken place, one
party sought to avoid its enforcement. 02 Had the Bergesen court
refused to allow enforcement of the award in the United States,
this avoidance scheme probably would have been successful be-
cause no other forum for enforcement existed. 103 Thus, the court's
decision carries out the initial agreement of the parties by prevent-
97 See McMahon, supra note 8, at 735; see also Mirabito, supra note 15, at 471.
" See McMahon, supra note 8, at 741-42. The Convention incorporates the principle of
reciprocity in two separate provisions. The first reference to reciprocity appears in the first
reservation of article 1(3). See supra note 30. In addition, article XIV incorporates a general
principle of reciprocity: "A Contracting State shall not be entitled to avail itself of the pre-
sent Convention against other Contracting States except to the extent that it is itself bound
to apply the Convention." U.N. Cony., supra note 8, art. XIV.
McMahon, supra note 8, at 741.
100 Id. at 741 n.29.
101 See supra note 98.
Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 930. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
'"Bergesen, 548 F. Supp. at 651-52. The only other forum for enforcement of the award
was Switzerland; however, the award was unlikely to be enforced in Switzerland because the
Swiss court apparently agreed with Muller that confirmation of the award in New York was
a condition precedent to obtaining an enforceable judgement on the award in Switzerland.
1984]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
ing one party from wrongfully avoiding its effects.1 "
Despite these beneficial aspects, a major drawback of the deci-
sion is the court's failure to precisely delimit the parameters of its
holding. 1°0 The court defined the "not considered as domestic" cri-
terion to encompass awards pronounced under foreign law or in-
volving parties domiciled or having their principal place of busi-
ness abroad."e The court then stated that an award rendered
between two aliens comes within this definition.107 It is not clear
from the court's decision, however, whether other combinations of
aliens and United States citizens involved in arbitration will fall
within the definition. 08 In particular, it is unclear whether the
"not considered as domestic" criterion applies to an award ren-
dered between an alien and a United States citizen. 09 The imple-
menting legislation states that an award arising out of a relation-
ship which is entirely between United States citizens shall not be
deemed to fall under the Convention. 10 This statement seems to
imply that as long as both parties are not United States citizens,
an award will "not be considered as domestic" in the United
States."' The court reasons that because Congress did not specifi-
cally exclude an award between two aliens, such an award is "not
considered as domestic" and is thus enforceable. 2 Under such
reasoning, an award rendered between a United States citizen and
an alien would also be "not considered as domestic" because it was
not specifically excluded by Congress from the Convention's
scope." ' The court, however, seems to limit its decision to a situa-
tion involving two alien parties; thus, all that is clear from the
opinion is that an award between two aliens or an award rendered
in accordance with foreign law is "not considered as domestic" in
104 See Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932-34.
'o The court emphasized that an award arising out of a dispute between two aliens is
enforceable in the United States under the Convention. Id. at 932. The court also stated
that awards rendered in accordance with foreign law or involving parties having their princi-
pal place of business outside the United States will be enforceable under the Convention.
Id. The court did not make clear, howevef, whether it adopted the view that all awards
other than those exclusively between United States citizens involving purely domestic mat-
ters are enforceable under the Convention. See supra note 90.
10" Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932.
10I d.
108 See supra note 105.
109 Id.
110 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1976). See supra note 37.
.' See McMahon, supra note 8, at 740.
Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 933.
10 See McMahon, supra note 8, at 742.
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the United States.
The Bergesen case marks the first time a circuit court has di-
rectly addressed the issue of the applicability of the Convention.
Although the opinion is somewhat at odds with history'1 4 and is
lacking in precision,11 it is a tremendous step forward in resolving
some of the questions surrounding the enforcement of foreign arbi-
tration awards. Whether the courts in future cases will again fall
back on the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 whenever possible,
however, or whether future decisions will continue to delineate the
scope of the Convention, remains to be seen.
Susan P. Brown
14 See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
a See supra notes 105-113 and accompanying text.
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